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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The State appeals from the district court's order granting Mr. Kent's motion to suppress.
Because the district court correctly determined that Mr. Kent unequivocally invoked his right to
remain silent and that the arresting officer was not free to ignore that invocation, the district
court's order should be affirmed.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts are taken from the district court's order on the motion to suppress:
While assisting in a probation search of Mr. Kent's home, Officer Bonzo found
paraphernalia and contraband in the defendant's room. (R., p.68.) Mr. Kent was not home at the
time so the officer scheduled for a meeting with him. (R., p.68.) After the first mutually agreed
upon meeting time fell through, the officer was able to meet with Mr. Kent on August 6, 2018.
(R., p.68.) That morning, Mr. Kent said he would speak with the officer until his carpool arrived.
(R., p.68.) At the beginning of their conversation, Mr. Kent denied that the paraphernalia was
his.

(R., pp.68-69.)

Eventually the officer began reading Mr. Kent his Miranda 1 rights.

(R., p.69.) As the rights were being read, however, Mr. Kent interrupted and said he would not
answer any questions. (R., p.69.)

The officer continued reading, and after finishing, asked

Mr. Kent if he would continue talking. (R., p.69.) The defendant said "Yeah, you can follow
me" and continued the conversation, eventually making incriminating statements. (R., p.69.) At
no point was Mr. Kent arrested or restrained, he was never told he was not able to leave, and he
was never told he could not terminate the conversation. (R., p.69.)

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1

Mr. Kent was charged with possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine,
possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(R., p.33.) He filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of his statements made after he
was given Miranda warnings. (R., p.54.) He asserted that suppression was appropriate because
"despite his invocation of his Fifth Amendments rights, Officer Bonzo continued to question
[him] which resulted in incriminating statements being made." (R., p.56.)
The district court granted the motion to suppress, holding that "Miranda warnings are not
required when an individual is not in custody, and, if given, do not create custody. However,
where Miranda warnings are read to an individual unnecessarily and the defendant invokes the
right to remain silent, an officer may not ignore that invocation." (R., p.69.) The State appealed.
(R., p.80.) Because the district court correctly determined that Mr. Kent unequivocally invoked
his right to remain silent and that Officer Bonzo was not free to ignore that invocation, the
district court's order should be affirmed.

2

ISSUE
Did the district court correctly grant Mr. Kent's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Kent's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Because the district court correctly determined that Mr. Kent unequivocally invoked his

right to remain silent and that Officer Bonzo was not free to ignore that invocation, the district
court's order should be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
"In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated." State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted).

"This Court will accept the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly

erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court's application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found." Id. (citations omitted). "At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Correctly Granted Mr. Kent's Motion To Suppress
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that if

an individual in custody invokes the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, that invocation
must be scrupulously honored, police questioning must cease, and authorities may reinitiate
interrogation only after a significant period of time has passed. Id.; see also Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96, 104-06 (1975). The invocation of the right to remain silent must be express, clear,
unambiguous, and unequivocal. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010). The
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question presented by this case is what an officer must do when a defendant unequivocally
invokes the right to remain silent during a noncustodial interrogation. Mr. Kent submits that the
same analysis should apply because he has the same right to remain silent regardless of whether
he is in custody.
In this case, the district court held that "Miranda warnings are not required when an
individual is not in custody, and, if given, do not create custody. However, where Miranda
warnings are read to an individual unnecessarily and the defendant invokes the right to remain
silent, an officer may not ignore that invocation." (R., p.69.) The district court is correct. The
State has not challenged the district court's critical finding in this case - that Mr. Kent
unequivocally invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. (See generally Appellant's
Brief; R., p.70 ("[T]he defendant invoked his right to remain silent while hearing those rights.").)
Because Mr. Kent has a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent regardless of whether or not he
is subject to custodial interrogation, and because he unequivocally invoked that right, the State's
argument fails.
"A defendant's decision to exercise his or her constitutional right to remain silent precustody cannot be used in the State's case-in-chief solely for the purpose of inferring guilt."
State v. Neyhart, 160 Idaho 746, 753 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60

(2011)). "This is because a defendant's constitutional protections are always available regardless
of whether the defendant has received Miranda warnings and regardless of whether the
defendant is in custody." Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820 (1998)). To assert the
privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant generally must expressly invoke the right to
remain silent. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 189-89 (2013). There is no dispute here that
Mr. Kent expressly invoked his right to remain silent.
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Because Mr. Kent had the right to remam silent regardless of whether he received
Miranda warnings and regardless of whether he was in custody, the State's reliance on State v.
Hurst, 151 Idaho 430 (Ct. App. 2011), is misplaced.

Hurst deals entirely with the Fifth

Amendment right to counsel, not the right to remain silent.

See generally id.

The Fifth

Amendment right to counsel during a custodial interrogation is created by Miranda, as it is a
separate right than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S
171, 177-79 (1991). The Hurst Court held that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel cannot be
invoked unless an individual is in custody because "[ o ]ne cannot invoke a right that does not
exist." Hurst, 151 Idaho at 436 (quoting People v. Villalobos, 737 N.E.2d 639,645 (Ill. 2000)).
Because the right to remain silent exists regardless of whether an individual is in custody, Hurst
is inapplicable in this case.
Several other cases to which the State cites as persuasive authority suffer from this same
deficiency. For example, in Commonwealth v. Libby, 32 N.E.2d 890 (Mass. 2015), the court
concluded that, because the defendant was not in custody, "he did not effectively invoke a 'right'
to counsel." Id. at 890 (emphasis added). In Commonwealth v. Morgan, 610 A.2d 1013 (Pa.
Super. 1992), the court held, "that it is error for a court to consider a confession presumptively
coerced merely because a request for a lawyer is not honored where, as here, the suspect was not
in custody at the time." Id. at 1018 (emphasis added).
Unlike Hurst and these other cases involving the right to counsel to which the State cites,
Mr. Kent invoked a right he unquestionably had. Thus, to agree with the State in this case would
require this Court to hold that an officer is not required to honor an individual's invocation of his
right to remain silent if that individual is not in custody. This Court should reject that premise.
As has already been noted, a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is always
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available regardless of whether the defendant has received Miranda warnings and regardless of
whether the defendant is in custody. Moore, 131 Idaho at 820. If the right is not dependent on
whether an individual is in custody or whether he has received Miranda warnings, then it follows
that the same rule should apply when that individual invokes the right, regardless of whether he
is in custody or received Miranda warnings.
It is true that other courts have held that officers do not need to scrupulously honor the
invocation of the right to remain silent in noncustodial settings. See, e.g., State v. Jeffreys, 682
A.2d 951, 953 (Vt. 1996). However, cases like these are based on a premise that has been
rejected in Idaho - that the right against self-incrimination does not attach until the suspect is in
custody. As the Jeffreys Court noted, "[w]e have held, 'the right against self-incrimination ...
does not attach absent custodial interrogation or a situation approximating incommunicado
interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere."' Id. at 952-53 (quoting State v. Houle, 642
A.2d 1178, 1181 (Vt. 1994)).
The Idaho Supreme Court disagrees. See Moore, 131 Idaho at 820. In Moore, this Court
considered whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence could be used in the State's case in chief Id.
The Court noted a split of authority on the issue:
The United States Supreme Court has approved the use of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence to impeach a defendant who has testified at trial. Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Brecht does not apply in this case, however,
because the testimony in question was introduced as part of the State's case in
chief, and not in rebuttal to Moore's testimony. The federal circuits are split on
whether pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence can be used as part of the prosecution's
case in chief The First, Seventh and Tenth circuits have held that pre-arrest, preMiranda silence cannot be used except for impeachment purposes, United
States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d
1562 (1st Cir. 1989); United States ex. rel Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir.
1987); while the Fifth, Eleventh and D.C. circuits have held that pre-arrest, preMiranda silence is admissible. United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th
Cir.1996); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has
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specifically declined to decide this issue. United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849
(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1993). Several
state appellate courts have held that the use by the prosecution of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence to infer guilt violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent. State v. Easter, 922 P.2d 1285 (Wash.1996); Tortolito v. State, 901
P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1995); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993); State v.
Rowland, 234 Neb. 846,452 N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 1990).
Id. After acknowledging this split of authority, the Court adopted the "better rule," which "holds

that the defendants' Fifth Amendment right not to have their silence used against them in a court
proceeding is applicable pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. The constitutional right is
always present.

Id. (emphasis added).

"'While the presence of Miranda warnings might

provide an additional reason for disallowing use of the defendant's silence, they are not a
necessary condition to such a prohibition.' Savory, 832 F.2d at 1018." Id. Miranda only defines
the time at which the interrogation has become so coercive that the defendant must be advised of
his rights and waive them." Id. at 820-21.
Because individuals possess exactly the same Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
regardless of whether they are in custody, and regardless of whether they have received Miranda
warnings, this Court should apply the same standard to an unequivocal assertion that right
regardless of when it is asserted. As the district court recognized, this standard was applied by
the Court of Appeals in State v. Whipple, 134 Idaho 498 (Ct. App. 2000).

(R., p.73.) In

Whipple, the defendant voluntarily appeared at the sheriffs office and requested to speak with an

officer. Id. at 503. "Whipple was not under arrest and the Miranda warning given was merely
precautionary." Id. The defendant spoke for nearly an hour and eventually said, "I don't wanna
say that, I don't want to," and eventually exclaimed. "NO MORE, NO MORE!" Id. The Court
of Appeals noted that the assertion of the right to remain silent must be unequivocal and that the
defendant was "merely having a difficult catharsis," not invoking his right to remain silent. Id. at
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504.

Therefore, "under the facts of this case, [the officer] was not required to terminate

questioning or seek a clarification of whether Whipple did in fact wish to invoke his right to
remain silent . . ." Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals has held that an officer must honor an
unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent during a voluntary interview. This case is
Whipple with an unequivocal assertion of the right to remain silent.

The State addresses Whipple only in a footnote, and it asserts "that the Court of Appeals
did not signal how it would come out on this issue by not addressing the topic at all. At best, this
case stands for the proposition that neither side raised the legal significance of the fact Whipple
was not in custody as an issue." (Respondent's Brief, p.6 n.1.) Mr. Kent submits that the Court
of Appeals clearly analyzed whether the defendant was in custody, and then applied the Miranda
standard after concluding that he was not in custody. Whipple is consistent with this Court's
conclusion in Moore that the right to remain silent does not depend on whether a suspect is in
custody and supports the conclusion that the same standard should be applied regardless of
whether an individual is in custody. Idaho has already determined that, with regard to the remain
silent, Miranda does not grant additional protection, it "only defines the time at which the
interrogation has become so coercive that the defendant must be advised of his rights and waive
them." Moore, 131 Idaho at 821. Thus, this Court should hold that, upon an unequivocal
assertion of the right to remain silent, an officer must scrupulously honor that right.
However, even if this Court agrees with the State that an officer generally does not need
to scrupulously honor the invocation of the right to remain silent absent custodial interrogation,
the unique facts of this case still require application of this rule here. This is because Officer
Bonzo specifically told Mr. Kent that he had the right to remain silent. While he may not have
been required to give this warning, once he did, Officer Bonzo was not free to ignore it. As
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noted by the district court in this case, "law enforcement officers are not free to give
the Miranda warning and then blatantly ignore a suspect's attempt to invoke any right
thereunder." U.S. v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998).
While the State complains that this is dicta, the court's conclusion is not incorrect. The
Bautista Court made this statement because it was troubled by the government's argument in that

case. The Bautista Court stated,
Finally, we address the government's assertion that it makes no difference that
Agent Leggitt unnecessarily advised Bautista of his Miranda rights when
Bautista was not in custody. The government's position misses the point
of Miranda and Edwards. If the authorities are free to tell a suspect that he has
the right to appointed counsel, but could, while continuing to interrogate him,
refuse to provide such counsel on the grounds that the suspect was not actually in
custody, the suspect would be led to believe that no request for counsel would be
honored. "The coercive effect of continued interrogation would thus be greatly
increased because the suspect would believe that the police 'promises' to provide
the suspect's constitutional rights were untrustworthy, and that the police would
continue to violate those rights as they wished, regardless of assurances to the
contrary." Tukes [v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 516 n. 11 (11 th Cir. 1990)]. We do
not suggest that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily in any
situation, i.e., in a context other than custodial interrogation, as the Court
cautioned in McNeil. See McNeil [v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 182 n. 3 (1991)]
("We have in fact never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than 'custodial interrogation."'); [United
States v.] LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 340 (7 th Cir. 1994) (defendant may not
invoke Miranda rights anticipatorily). However, law enforcement officers are not
free to give the Miranda warning and then blatantly ignore a suspect' s attempt to
invoke any right thereunder.
Id. at 1150-51. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has stated,

[w]e feel constrained to address an argument raised by the state at oral argument
regarding the result of giving Miranda warnings. At the stationhouse Tukes was
read a waiver of rights form, described as a 'Standard Miranda Warning Form.'
The state contends that because Tukes was not in custody when he was read
his Miranda warnings, had he invoked his right to counsel the police would have
been free to ignore that invocation. The state's position is without merit.
Tukes, 911 F.2d at 516 n.11. Thus, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits agree that even if the general

rule is that a suspect cannot anticipatorily invoke Miranda protections and must be in custody,
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there must be an exception when an officer provides Miranda warnings and then refuses to honor
them, as was the case here. As these circuit courts have explained, in circumstances such as this
one, the suspect would be led to believe that his rights would not be honored and that the police
could continue to violate those rights regardless of assurances to the contrary.
Like the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the district court in this case similarly concerned.
Specifically, the court stated,
Failure to follow Miranda procedures after the invocation of the right to remain
silent, where a suspect has just been informed he has those rights, bears the risks
mentioned in Bautista. Specifically, a defendant could be led to the belief that his
rights would not ever be honored in any circumstance. The warnings, which
could be given at any time, would fail to serve their purpose of informing the
defendant that he was free to exercise a right at that given time.
Also, if the Miranda warnings are given but the protections required once a right
is asserted are not enforced, the Miranda warnings themselves because a strategic
consideration for the interrogating officer; i.e. the recitation of rights could be
reduced to a technique used to elicit a confession. Skilled interrogators need a
variety of techniques and are free to use appropriate ones. The rights advisement
should not be reduced to a tactic (to be clear, there is no indication that the officer
here was attempting that).
Requiring the same procedure for invocation of the right to remain silent after an
unnecessary warning as is required for an invocation during a custodial
interrogation avoids this outcome. Additionally, using the same procedure
preserves clarity for law enforcement and avoids adding another layer to the
Miranda analysis. Consequently, the benefits of requiring the full Miranda
procedure after an invocation of the right to remain silent after an unnecessary
warning outweighs the costs, and there are costs to be sure.
(R., p.77.) The district court's concerns are valid. Defendants could be led to believe that their
rights would not be honored, and requiring the same standard regardless of custody provides
clarity for both law enforcement and the public. This Court should therefore hold that, once a
suspect has had their Miranda warnings read to the them, and he has unequivocally asserted
them in response, suppression of the statements is required if the officer does not honor that
invocation.
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Finally, even though the district court found otherwise, this Court should hold that
Mr. Kent's confession was not voluntary. Mr. Kent specifically asserted that this confession was
involuntary in his motion to suppress. (See R., pp.54-56.) Thus, this Court can affirm on the
"right result, wrong reason" theory. See State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217 (2019). To determine
whether a confession is voluntary, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances and ask
whether the defendant's will was overborne by police conduct. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 287-88 (1991); State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214 (1993); State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910,
912 (Ct. App. 2012). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, a court should consider
the

characteristics

of the

accused

and the

details

of the

interrogation,

including

whether Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the accused, the accused's level of
education or low intelligence, the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of
the questioning, and the deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,
226 (1973).
Mr. Kent submits that, in a situation like this where Miranda warnings are given, the
right to remain silent is invoked, and the invocation is ignored, a confession is rendered
involuntary. As the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have noted, in circumstances such as this one,
the suspect would be led to believe that his rights would not be honored and that the police
would continue to violate those rights regardless of assurances to the contrary. See Bautista, 145
F.3d at 1150-51; Tukes, 911 F.2d at 516 n.11. The only conclusion a suspect is going to draw in
these situations is that the invocation of their right is not going to be honored and therefore they
are required to speak. Because this is the only conclusion a suspect is going to draw, this Court
should hold that failing to honor the invocation of the right to remain silent following a Miranda
warning renders a subsequent confession involuntary.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Kent requests that the district court's order be affirmed.
DATED this 21 st day of February, 2020.

/s/ Justin M. Curtis
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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